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Non-Technical Summary
Every year, secondary school graduates have to choose a university. This is a crucial
decision for their future trajectories made under imperfect information. Therefore, quality
indicators like university rankings and an excellence competition may provide valuable
information for choosing a university.
This paper analyzes whether prospective students in fact use quality indicators as a source
of information within the application process and whether the influence of the indicators
differs with respect to various quality dimensions – e.g. research quality, mentoring,
faculty infrastructure, student assessment and excellence status. Therefore, I estimate
the effect of different quality indicators from a German university ranking and an ex-
cellence initiative run by the German government on the university application decision
of high-ability students. As identification relies on the variation in ranking indicators
and excellence status over time, I can disentangle the effect of the additional information
provided by the rankings from the common knowledge regarding university quality.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the influence of ranking
indicators with respect to various quality dimensions, while at the same time controlling
for overall university attractiveness. I use a very comprehensive, administrative data set
provided by the German central agency (‘ZVS’) administering the application process
for medical schools. The data set contains individual information on all applicants at
German medical schools for the years 2002-2008.
The evaluation of the excellence initiative shows that in the course of the competition the
share of applicants increased on average by 19 % at the winning universities, which are
today known as “excellence universities”. The results regarding the different ranking in-
dicators suggest that the non-research dimensions “student-professor ratio”, the number
of “clinic beds”, and the “students’ satisfaction” rather than the research-related indica-
tors influence university choice of high-ability students. This may seem counterintuitive,
but is plausible as research quality seems to be common knowledge within the group of
high-ability students. In this case, the research related ranking indicators do not provide
any additional information. Hence, university rankings are in action if they add new
information to the common knowledge of university quality. Yet, the different quality
indicators influence prospective student’s university choice only to a moderate extent.
Distance between a student’s hometown and the university remains the most powerful
determinant of university choice in Germany.
Nevertheless, providing information on all quality dimensions separately instead of pub-
lishing university rankings in aggregated league tables widens the basis of information
and thus supports a well-informed university choice. This in turn could reduce drop-out
rates, increase human capital production and – depending on the social welfare function
– may also increase overall welfare. Furthermore, multidimensional rankings also induce
incentives for the top research institutes to not only invest in research but also in the
non-research quality dimensions such as mentoring, faculty infrastructure and the overall
satisfaction of their students.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Jedes Jahr mu¨ssen sich Abiturienten nicht nur fu¨r ein Studienfach, sondern auch fu¨r
eine Universita¨t entscheiden. Diese Wahl der Universita¨t treffen sie jedoch unter un-
vollsta¨ndiger Information bezu¨glich ihrer eigenen Fa¨higkeiten, der Qualita¨t der Uni-
versita¨t sowie dem jeweiligen Ertrag eines Hochschulabschlusses. Daher ko¨nnten Qua-
lita¨tsindikatoren wie Hochschulrankings und Exzellenzlabels wertvolle Informationen fu¨r
die Wahl der Universita¨t liefern.
Dieses Papier analysiert, ob angehende Studierende Qualita¨tsindikatoren als Informati-
onsquelle wa¨hrend des Bewerbungsprozesses nutzen und ob sich der Einfluss verschie-
dener Rankingdimensionen – z.B. Forschung, Betreuung, Infrastruktur der Fakulta¨t so-
wie die Zufriedenheit der derzeitigen Studierenden – unterscheidet. Dafu¨r wird unter-
sucht, wie die verschiedenen Rankingindikatoren des Centrums fu¨r Hochschulentwicklung
(CHE) sowie die 2006 und 2007 verliehenen Exzellenzlabels die Wahl der Universita¨t von
hochqualifizierten Bewerbern beeinflussen. Um die Bedeutung der verschiedenen Qua-
lita¨tsdimensionen von der allgemeinen Attraktivita¨t einer Universita¨t unterscheiden zu
ko¨nnen, nutzt die Studie die Vera¨nderungen der Rankings und Exzellenzlabels u¨ber die
Zeit.
Die Analysen erga¨nzen die bestehende Literatur durch die Betrachtung verschiedener
Rankingdimensionen bei gleichzeitiger Beru¨cksichtigung der allgemeinen Attraktivita¨t
einer Hochschule. Dafu¨r wird ein umfassender, administrativer Datensatz der deutschen
Zentralstelle fu¨r die Vergabe von Studienpla¨tzen (ZVS) ausgewertet. Dieser entha¨lt indi-
viduelle Informationen aller Bewerber fu¨r ein Medizinstudium der Jahre 2002 bis 2008.
Die Evaluation der Exzellenzinitiative zeigt, dass der Anteil der Bewerber an den “Ex-
zellenz-Universita¨ten” durchschnittlich um 19% angestiegen ist. Des Weiteren scheinen
die nicht forschungsbezogenen Qualita¨tsdimensionen wie das Betreuungsverha¨ltnis, die
Infrastruktur der Fakulta¨t und die Zufriedenheit der Studierenden die Hochschulwahl
sta¨rker zu beeinflussen als die forschungsbezogenen Rankingindikatoren. Dieses Ergeb-
nis mag kontraintuitiv erscheinen, ist aber durchaus plausibel. Ist die Forschungsqualita¨t
der Hochschulen allgemein bekannt und wird zu einem Großteil als u¨ber die Zeit kon-
stant wahrgenommen, so bieten die forschungsbezogenen Indikatoren des Rankings keine
zusa¨tzlichen Informationen fu¨r die Bewerber. Qualita¨tsindikatoren beeinflussen die Wahl
der Universita¨t somit vor allem dann, wenn sie zusa¨tzliche, ohne das Ranking unbekann-
te Informationen u¨ber die Qualita¨t der Universita¨ten liefern. Insgesamt ist der Einfluss
von Qualita¨tsindikatoren auf die Hochschulwahl jedoch moderat. Die Entfernung zur
Universita¨t bleibt in Deutschland weiterhin der sta¨rkste Einflussfaktor fu¨r die Wahl der
Hochschule.
Die Vero¨ffentlichung von Rankings in verschiedenen Qualita¨tsdimensionen vergro¨ßert aber
in jedem Falle die Informationsbasis gegenu¨ber aggregierten Hochschulrankings und un-
terstu¨tzt somit eine wohlu¨berlegte Hochschulwahl. Eine verbesserte Passung zwischen
Studenten und Universita¨t ko¨nnte wiederum zu besseren Bildungsergebnissen fu¨hren
und so dem Gemeinwohl dienen. Zusa¨tzlich ko¨nnten multidimensionale Rankings fu¨r die
Top-Forschungsfakulta¨ten auch Anreize zur Investition in die Qualita¨tsdimensionen Be-
treuung, Infrastruktur und die Zufriedenheit der Studierenden erzeugen.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how high-ability students respond to different indicators of
university quality when applying for a university. Are some quality dimensions of
a ranking, e.g. research reputation or mentoring more important than others? I
estimate a random utility model using administrative application data of all Ger-
man medical schools. As identification relies on the variation in quality indicators
over time, I can disentangle the response to changes in quality indicators from the
common knowledge regarding the overall university attractiveness. Results show
that the ranking provides more relevant information in the quality dimensions men-
toring, infrastructure and students’ satisfaction than with respect to research.
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1 Introduction
Every year, secondary school graduates that want to pursue higher education have to
choose a university. This is a crucial decision for their future trajectories made under
imperfect information regarding their own ability, university quality and the correspond-
ing returns to a degree. From an economist’s point of view, it is very important that
prospective students apply for the universities that fit them best in order to maximize
human capital production and to minimize drop-outs. Therefore, university rankings and
indicators of excellence may provide valuable information for the decision of prospective
students.
In this paper, I analyze whether high-ability students in fact use different university qual-
ity indicators as a source of information and whether some quality dimensions are more
important for an applicant’s decision than others. For this purpose, I estimate the effect of
different quality indicators from a German university ranking – as well-established as the
U.S. News & World Report ranking in the U.S. – on the university application decision of
high-ability students. As an additional quality indicator, I use an excellence competition
run by the German government, which declared some universities to be “excellence uni-
versities” and granted them extra money. Identification relies on the variation induced
by changes in the ranking indicators over time and the introduction of the excellence
status. This allows me to disentangle the response to changing quality indicators from
the time-constant, common knowledge regarding the overall university attractiveness.
In contrast to the U.S. higher education system, the German system is traditionally
based on public universities which were recognized as quite homogeneous with respect to
their quality. During the last couple of years, however, several changes towards a more
competitive market have been implemented. With the publication of university rankings
in the media starting from the 1990’s on, the quality of different institutions has become
directly comparable for the first time. Furthermore, the European Bologna Declaration
from 1999 induced a change in the German higher education system to create comparable
tertiary degrees throughout Europe and to increase the international competitiveness of
the European system of higher education.1 From 2006 onwards, some German federal
states introduced tuition fees,2 and in 2006 and 2007, the German government has run
an excellence initiative awarding extra funding to the universities with the best future
concept for research. This said, it is very likely that university choice has recently become
more important for prospective students. Especially, as Brewer et al. (1999) and Strayer
(2002) show that the type of university an individual chooses significantly affects post-
school earnings.
1For an evaluation of the German Bologna Process see Horstschra¨er and Sprietsma (2010).
2For analyses regarding the introduction of tuition fees in Germany see Dwenger et al. (2011) and
Hu¨bner (2009).
1
The theoretical literature characterizes the “College Admission Problem” as a two-sided
market (Gale and Shapley; 1962; Roth and Sotomayor; 1989). On the one hand, prospec-
tive students decide where to apply and, once admitted, whether to accept the university’s
offer. On the other hand, universities (or a central authority) determine who is admit-
ted. The admission problem can be evaluated from three different perspectives: (i) the
prospective student who most likely wants to maximize his human capital, (ii) the uni-
versities which try to maximize the aggregated human capital of their graduates, and
(iii) a social welfare perspective where the optimum depends on the assumed social wel-
fare function. According to Becker (1973) and Chade et al. (2011), welfare is maximized
by assigning the best students to the best universities as long as student and university
quality are complements. Such a sorting of prospective students into universities exists
in a two-sided market only if universities differ sufficiently in quality (Chade et al.; 2011).
Along this line, a hypothesis is that publishing quality indicators may enhance human
capital and – depending on the social welfare function – may also enhance a welfare
maximizing assortative sorting.
An extensive empirical literature exists on the decision whether or not to attend univer-
sity. However, this paper contributes to the more recent literature on where to attend
university. Existing evidence in the field of university choice addresses both the influence
of financial aid (e.g. Ehrenberg and Sherman; 1984; McPherson and Schapiro; 1991; Moore
et al.; 1991; Avery and Hoxby; 2003) and non-monetary factors (e.g. Toutkoushian; 2001;
Mueller and Rockerbie; 2005; Griffith and Rask; 2007; Berkowitz and Hoekstra; 2011)
on the matriculation (or application) decision. For the U.S., Weiler (1996) analyzes
monetary and non-monetary factors influencing the matriculation decision of high-ability
students and shows that attendance costs as well as non-monetary characteristics, such
as university quality and reputation, are significant factors.
The influence of rankings on university choice, is explicitly studied by Monks and Ehren-
berg (1999), Mueller and Rockerbie (2005) and Griffith and Rask (2007). Monks and
Ehrenberg (1999) study the influence of the U.S. News & World Report rankings on ad-
mission at selective private institutions. They show that low ranked universities accept
a higher share of applicants, that more accepted applicants do not matriculate and that
matriculated students have lower SAT scores. Using Canadian application data, Mueller
and Rockerbie (2005) find that an improvement in rank, in general, has a positive in-
fluence on the aggregated number of applications. The U.S. study by Griffith and Rask
(2007) on an individual level also suggests that the matriculation decision of high-ability
students is influenced by changes in rank, and that rankings can affect individuals het-
erogeneously with respect to gender, nationality and ability. However, the Anglo-Saxon
higher education system has always been more competitive than the comparatively ho-
2
mogeneous German higher education sector. Therefore, it is not obvious whether the
international evidence is applicable to the German context.
The German studies by Bu¨ttner et al. (2003) and Helbig and Ulbricht (2010) analyze
the influence of German university rankings on the number of matriculated students
and the sorting of students according to ability. They show that rankings also seem to
influence the matriculation decision in Germany. However, both German studies fail to
disentangle the effect of the additional information provided by the rankings from the
common knowledge regarding university attractiveness.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on university rankings by distinguishing
the importance of different quality dimensions, while controlling for the common knowl-
edge regarding university attractiveness. To my knowledge, this analysis is the first to
provide evidence regarding the importance of different ranking dimensions. The inter-
national literature, so far, has been limited to the influence of the overall rank of an
university. The German multidimensional ranking of the Center for Higher Education
Development (CHE ranking), however, allows me to study several quality dimensions
separately. The main quality dimensions published are research reputation, mentoring,
faculty infrastructure as well as a recommendation by professors and students. An addi-
tional quality indicator studied is the excellence status awarded by the German govern-
ment within an excellence competition. My results thus provide additional knowledge on
which quality dimensions are (most) important for the university choice of prospective
students.
A random utility model explaining the application decision by university and individual
characteristics of the applicants is estimated using a conditional logit model. Due to
the inclusion of university fixed effects, identification relies on the variation in rankings
and excellence status over time. The estimated effects of the different quality indicators
on university choice thus only comprise the response to changes in university quality as
suggested by the indicators. The estimates do not reflect the time-constant, common
knowledge regarding university attractiveness, which is captured by the university fixed
effects.
I use a very comprehensive, administrative data set provided by the German central
agency (‘ZVS’) administering the application process for medical schools, which is sub-
sequently called central clearinghouse.3 The data set contains individual information on
all applicants at German medical schools for the years 2002-2008. This data set offers
two important advantages for my analysis. First, I can study the application rather than
the matriculation decision. This is important as the application decision is less driven
3In Germany, the university application process of the subjects medicine, pharmacology, veterinary
medicine, dentistry, psychology and biology has been administered by a central agency called ‘Zentral-
stelle zur Vergabe von Studienpla¨tzen’ (ZVS) during the observation period.
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by supply constraints. Second, the individual nature of the data allows me to control for
the distance between a student’s hometown and each university in the choice set, which
is shown to be a very important determinant of the application decision.
The results show that achieving excellence status increases the individual application
probability by 19%. Hence, the excellence competition run by the German government
significantly affects the university choice of high-ability students. Regarding the ranking
indicators, a high rank with respect to students’ satisfaction increases the application
probability, and a low rank in mentoring, faculty infrastructure as well as in the indicator
students’ satisfaction lowers the probability to apply. The research oriented indicators
of the German university ranking show no significant influence on the application prob-
ability. Research quality nevertheless proofs to be a very important determinant for
choosing a university. However, it seems to be common knowledge and therefore part of
the general attractiveness of a university. In this case, the non-research ranking indicators
provide more relevant information for the university choice of high-ability students than
the research-oriented indicators. Publishing multidimensional university rankings, thus,
widens the basis of information for a well-informed university choice.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I give a more
detailed overview on the institutional background of the German university ranking,
the excellence initiative and the central admission procedure (Section 2). Subsequently,
Section 3 describes the application data including first descriptive evidence, Section 4
explains the estimation strategy, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The German higher education sector used to be quite homogeneous with respect to the
quality of universities. The share of private institutions is traditionally very low. The
public universities are administered and financed by the 16 German federal states. Unlike
in the Anglo-Saxon system, no specific universities were considered as elite institutions,
and no tuition fees existed until 2006. In general, only a registration fee of about 100
Euros had been levied each term by the universities. However, competition between
universities has been encouraged lately. Besides the introduction of tuition fees and
changes in the degree system due to the European homogenization, university rankings
became publicly available and presumably also more important to prospective students
due to encouraged competition.
German university rankings have been published in the media since the 1990’s. For
the first time, universities and prospective students could compare the quality regarding
various quality dimensions between institutions. The university ranking of the Center for
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Higher Education Development (CHE ranking) is used for the analysis in this paper. It
was first published in 1998 and is – similar to the U.S. News & World Report rankings
for the U.S. – the most comprehensive and most detailed ranking of German higher
education institutions. The first ranking of medical schools has been published in 2003
in the weekly magazine ”Stern”, and the second ranking of 2006 has been issued with the
weekly newspaper ”Die Zeit”. Both newspapers are well known and widely recognized
outlets within Germany.4
Unlike the well-known rankings, such as the U.S. News & World Report ranking in the
U.S. or the world-wide “The Times Higher Education Supplement” and the “Shanghai-
Ranking of World Universities”, the German CHE ranking provides information on the
subject level. Hence, rather university departments than universities as a whole are
compared, which allows a much more detailed assessment. Another difference is that the
CHE ranking does not publish league tables. The departments are instead merely sorted
into a top, middle and bottom quality group. Most importantly for my analysis, the CHE
ranking assesses various quality dimensions and publishes the results in all dimensions
separately without aggregating them into an overall rank. This procedure avoids the
controversial assignment of weighting factors to each indicator and enables prospective
students to consider the quality dimensions most important to them.
All quality indicators rely either on facts collected on the university department level,
on an evaluation by professors of the respective subject or on an assessment by current
students. The ranking comprises all major subjects, and every subject is ranked in a
three year cycle. The main indicators in the publications of medical schools rankings –
which are the ones used in my analysis – are:
• professors’ recommendation
• research reputation
• student-professor ratio
• number of clinic beds
• students’ satsifaction
For each of these measures, the published indicators only display whether the respective
university is ranked into the top, middle or bottom group and whether that position
has changed since the last ranking. To construct the indicator “professors’ recommen-
dation” (“research reputation”), professors are asked to name the top five universities in
their field with respect to the overall university quality (research quality). Note, profes-
4Other German rankings published during the observation period 2003-2008 are the ranking of the
magazine “Focus” (2004,2007) and the magazine “Spiegel” (2004,2006). However, both rankings are not
as comprehensive as the CHE ranking. Note also that there is a general discussion on the quality and
methodology of university rankings. This paper, though, aims to assess in a first step whether quality
indicators indeed influence students’ application choice. In case that rankings are indeed important for
university choice, a thorough analysis of the rankings methodology is necessary.
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sors cannot recommend the university at which they are currently teaching. Universities
named by more than a quarter of the professors are sorted into the top quality category
and universities not mentioned at all form the bottom quality group. Information on
the indicators “student-professor ratio” and the quantity of “clinic beds” are collected
at the university department level. The “student-professor ratio” indicates the number
of students per professor and the indicator “clinic beds” gives the quantity of beds per
100 students.5 The departments are sorted into quality groups by calculating quantiles.
Finally, the “students’ satisfaction” regarding their current study program is evaluated.
The top, middle and bottom quality groups for this indicator are constructed by calcu-
lating means and confidence intervals for the subject as a whole and for each department.
If the mean of a department and the full range of its confidence interval is higher than
the subjects’ mean, the department is grouped into the top category. Is the departments’
mean and its confidence interval below the subjects’ mean, the department is assigned
into the bottom quality group.
In addition to the introduction of university rankings, the excellence initiative run by the
German Government in 2006 and 2007 has been another move towards competition. In
principle, the initiative is a competition for extra funding between all German universities.
It is not restricted to a special subject (e.g. medical studies) but addresses universities as
a whole. The aim of the initiative was to strengthen German universities, to enhance their
international competitiveness, and to promote the visibility of German top-level research.
As part of the nationwide competition, additional funding has been given to the best
proposals for (i) graduate schools promoting young academics, (ii) clusters of excellence,
and (iii) institutional strategies of universities promoting top-level research. Successful
graduate schools were granted approximately one million Euros per year, clusters of
excellence in a specific field on average receive 6.5 million Euros per year, and universities
with promising institutional strategies to promote top-level research were awarded about
21 million Euros in total. This funding is limited to a maximum of five years. Important
to note is that especially the winning universities in the competition for strategies to
promote excellent research have received high media attention and have been recognized
as “excellence universities” since then.
Out of all 34 medical departments in Germany, six departments are located at universities
which became “excellence universities”. Munich was the only university with a medical
department that received the excellence status in October 2006. In October 2007, the
Universities of Aachen, Berlin, Freiburg, Go¨ttingen and Heidelberg followed. As the
results of the excellence competition were announced in October and the application
deadline for medicine is in July, the excellence status of the University of Munich became
5The number of clinic beds of a medical school is relevant because it determines how much practical
experience prospective students can expect.
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first relevant for the applicants of the year 2007. For all other “excellence universities”
only in 2008. However, in January 2006 and 2007, the committee of the excellence
initiative already announced which universities had been shortlisted.
The application procedure for universities in Germany differs by subject. For most sub-
jects, prospective students address their applications directly to the universities. However,
the application process is centrally administered by the central clearinghouse for some
subjects. During the years 2002 to 2008, six subjects – medicine, pharmacology, vet-
erinary medicine, dentistry, psychology and biology – had a centralized application and
admission process. Within the central application process, every applicant may indicate
a preference list of up to six universities and may apply within three different selection
procedures. A competition by (i) the final secondary school grade, a procedure based on
(ii) the duration that an applicant already is waiting for a university assignment, and (iii)
a direct assessment by the universities are applied sequentially. If an applicant cannot be
placed in procedure (i), his application is transferred to procedure (ii) and, if necessary,
further to procedure (iii). Since 2004 (before 2004), 20% (51%) of the places to study
have been assigned by the secondary school grade, 20% (25%) by the time of waiting,
and 60% (24%) of the places are allocated directly by the universities. The allocation
process within these three procedures, though, has not changed over time.
Within procedure (i) the competition by secondary school grades, it is verified in a first
step whether an applicant can be admitted at the university of his first preference. If there
are more applicants than places to study, the secondary school grade is decisive. In case
an applicant could not be placed at his first preference, the central clearinghouse examines
the possibilities at the university listed as the second preference. However, all applicants
who listed this university as their first preference are placed at this university first. This
demonstrates the high importance of the first preference in the listing.6 The competition
by (ii) the time of waiting is very similar. Here, the time of waiting is decisive if there
are more applicants than places. The criteria for (iii) the direct admission by universities
differ by university, but in general, the secondary school grade is very important once
again.
3 Data and Descriptives
The data set I use to assess whether the excellence initiative and the university rankings
have influenced the application decision of prospective students contains all applicants
at German universities in the centrally administered subjects within the years 2002 to
6For a more detailed description of the centrally administered application process see Braun et al.
(2010) and Braun and Dwenger (2009).
7
2008. A major advantage of this data set is that applications rather than matriculations
are observed. The revealed preferences are, thus, less likely to be biased by supply side
constraints.
Although the application data include all centrally administered subjects, I restrict the
sample to applicants in the field of medical studies, which is by far the subject with the
most applicants. Pharmacology, dentistry and veterinary medicine are excluded from
the analysis as these subjects are only offered by very few universities resulting in a
very limited choice set for prospective students. In the fields of psychology and biology,
Bachelor and Master degrees were introduced, and since then, the application process is
no longer centrally administered. Therefore, the analysis focuses solely on applicants for
medical studies.
Similar to Dwenger et al. (2011), my estimations are based on the first university prefer-
ence listed in the selection procedure using the secondary school grades. This is justified
as the first preference is very important for the allocation process (see Section 2 and
Braun et al. (2010)). In order to rule out any strategic preference listings, I only consider
high-ability students who received the best possible grade (i.e. 1.0) in the final secondary
school exam. This subgroup of students is not constrained by admission thresholds, as
the most restrictive threshold is having received the best final secondary school grade
(1.0) and applying at the specific university with first priority. Hence, all applicants in
my sample can state their true university preferences. The sample is further restricted to
applications for the semester beginning in fall from 2003 to 2008 as only few universities
accept applications for the semester beginning in spring and as the first ranking of medi-
cal schools has only been published in 2003. In case someone applied for two subjects at
a time (only possible until 2004), I only consider the application if medical studies is the
first subject preference. Repeated applications of applicants who were not assigned to a
university in their first year of application are also excluded from the analysis.
Table 1 displays the average share of applications per university and the individual char-
acteristics of the remaining 4,535 medicine applicants of the years 2003-2008. The descrip-
tives are disaggregated by excellence status and the main quality indicators.7 The average
share of applicants is significantly higher for “excellence universities” and the top ranked
departments in the category “professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation”.
The average share of applicants at an “excellence university” amounts to 12.63%, while
the average share in the non-excellence group is only 6.89%. With respect to the other
quality indicators “student-professor ratio”, “clinic beds” and “students’ satisfaction”,
there is not such a clear sorting pattern. Nevertheless, the differences are also signifi-
cant in a t-test. Examining the average share of female applicants in each quality group
7In addition, Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a comprehensive overview on all 34 medical schools
and their corresponding quality indicators.
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shows also heterogeneous results of the various ranking indicators. It seems that female
applicants prefer universities that are highly ranked in the categories “student-professor
ratio” and “students’ satisfaction”, whereas high ranks in “professors’ recommendation”
and “research reputation” are more important for male applicants. These differences
are significant. Statistically non-significant, however, are the deviations in the ranking
indicators “excellence university” and “clinic beds”.
Table 1: Mean Statistics disaggregated by Quality Indicators (2003-2008)
Exc. Prof. Rec. Res. Rep. Stud./Prof. Clinic Beds Stud. Satisf.
Top Group/Exc.
Appl./Uni (%) 12.63 13.63 13.41 3.02 9.55 3.10
Female (%) 66.83 63.46 63.30 70.66 65.57 71.93
N 3,920 1,894 1,951 1,002 938 1,001
Middle Group/Non-Exc.
Appl./Uni (%) 6.89 3.48 3.46 9.29 8.00 10.85
Female (%) 66.63 69.24 68.51 65.57 66.71 65.10
N 615 2,565 2,341 2,533 2,412 2,682
Bottom Group
Appl./Uni (%) n.a. 0.74 2.20 8.50 6.17 3.16
Female (%) n.a. 59.21 75.72 65.35 67.39 65.91
N n.a. 76 243 964 1,012 792
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations. The number of observations deviates due to missings in the
ranking variables. The indicator student-professor ratio (clinic beds, students’ tip) is missing for five (one, two) uni-
versities. Appl./Uni: Average share of applicants at a university, Exc.: Excellence University, Prof. Rec.: Professors’
Recommendation, Res. Rep.: Research Reputation, Stud./Prof.: Students per Professor, Stud. Satisf.: Students’
Satisfaction.
However, whether this selection pattern is induced by the quality indicators or by other
confounding factors, e.g. overall prestige of a medical school, is not clear by simply
looking at descriptive evidence. A mean comparison disaggregated by excellence status
and year, for example, showed that “excellence universities” already had a high share
of applicants before they received the official excellence status. Therefore, the question
I want to answer is whether the share of applicants has increased even further due to
the excellence initiative, and whether changes in the rankings over time influence the
application decision.
Figure 1, therefore, depicts the mean share of applicants over time for the universities
experiencing either an improving or a worsening in ranking indicators. Comparing mean
application shares after the new ranking of 2006 with respect to different quality di-
mensions mainly indicates small gains for universities improving in rank. The indicator
“research reputation” exhibits a strong increase in the average share of applications in
2007 and 2008 but not in 2006 when the new ranking has already been available. Look-
ing at the universities improving with respect to research in more detail, shows that this
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Figure 1: Share of Applicants at Universities with a change in Ranking (2003-2008)
Data Source: ZVS Data 2003-2008, own calculations.
increase is mainly driven by the University of Berlin becoming “excellence university” in
2008 (see Figure 2). Downgrading a university ranking in particular seems to lower the
application probability if the ranking is worsening in the dimension “student-professor
ratio” or with respect to the number of “clinic beds”. While the average share of appli-
cants for universities with a decreasing rank in these dimensions increased until 2005, the
share decreases after the publication of the second university ranking in 2006. Despite
a worsening ranking in “research reputation” and “students’ satisfaction”, the average
share of applicants for these universities is slightly increasing in 2006. On the one hand,
this could hint at other quality dimensions being more important for university choice.
On the other hand, these descriptive results could also be driven by other confounding
factors. Interestingly, the indicator “professors’ recommendation” is the most stable in-
dicator. Universities improving or worsening in this dimension show the least changes in
the average share of applicants.
Regarding the supply and demand of university places at “excellence universities”, Fig-
ure 2 depicts the share of applicants and the number of university places over time for
each of the six medical schools located at “excellence universities”. It provides descriptive
evidence on whether the probability to apply at a university has increased in the course of
the excellence initiative. The medical departments at the universities of Munich, Berlin
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Figure 2: Supply and Demand at “Excellence Universities” (2003-2008)
Data Source: ZVS Data 2003-2008, own calculations.
and too a lower extend also the University of Aachen indeed experience an increase in
the share of applications at the time of the excellence initiative. The share of applicants
in Munich has been increasing already since 2005. The increase in Berlin and Aachen,
however, sets off in 2007, which is the year they are shortlisted in the excellence initiative.
The demand for the other universities seems to be stable or even decreases (University
of Freiburg) in the years of the excellence initiative (2006, 2007 and 2008). The supply
side, i.e. the number of university places, is constant over time for most universities. In
Munich, though, the supply of university places slightly increases from 2005 to 2006. As
there may also be other confounding factors – i.e. tuition fees were introduced in many
federal states simultaneously to the excellence initiative – the descriptive evidence is not
conclusive. Therefore, the next section explains the multivariate estimation strategy.
4 Estimation strategy
In this section, I introduce the estimation strategy to estimate the influence of university
rankings and the excellence competition on the application probability in a multivariate
setting. Similar to Griffith and Rask (2007), the estimations are based on a random
utility model (Equation 1). The utility Uij of individual i applying at university j is
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explained by a deterministic part of applicant-university match specific characteristics
(Xij), university characteristics (Zj) as well as by an unobserved random component
ij. Assuming that applicants reveal their true preferences and behave rationally, the
observed choice of university maximizes their utility.
Uij = αXij + βZj + ij (1)
Following Mc Fadden (1974), I estimate the choice model using a conditional logit ap-
proach. In contrast to a multinomial logit, this allows me, to consider applicant-university
match specific variables (e.g. distance from hometown). For the conditional logit model,
the data needs to be in long form with j university observations for each applicant i.
As there are 34 different universities offering medical studies, my data set expands from
4,535 individual observations to 154,190 applicant-university observations. Intuitively,
the data set then contains the whole choice set of medical schools for each applicant.
The outcome yij is a binary variable indicating the university the applicant actually has
chosen to apply for. Thus, the estimation equation is specified as follows:
yij = α1EXCij + α2RANK1ij + α3RANK3ij + α4X˜ij + βUj + γUj ×Dij + ij (2)
The model incorporates EXCij, RANK1ij and RANK3ij as variables of interest. EXCij
is a binary variable being equal to one if university j has received an excellence status
at the time individual i is applying. RANK1ij (RANK3ij) is a vector of ranking out-
comes indicating whether university j is ranked in the top (bottom) group of a specific
quality measure. Hence, the ranking indicators for being in the top (bottom) group
are estimated in reference to the group of medium quality. X˜ij represents all applicant-
university – respectively also time-university8 – specific variables which are distance to
university, distance squared, a binary variable indicating the introduction of tuition fees
and the number of supplied university places. A set of dummy variables Uj controls
for university characteristics which are constant over all individuals and over time – e.g.
university quality that is common knowledge.9 In other words, Uj represents university
fixed effects that account for the time-constant common knowledge regarding university
attractiveness. By additionally interacting the university fixed effects with the distance
Dij of student’s i hometown to university j, I also take into account that students may
be willing to move further away for some universities but not for others. Hence, the
8Note that variables varying over time also vary between individuals as repeated cross-sections are
pooled over six years.
9Also city-specific characteristics, e.g. costs and quality of living, are captured by Uj , if they are
constant over time.
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importance of distance to university does not only differ between individuals but also
between universities.
The variation used for conditional logit estimation is within a student’s choice set. Hence,
the estimation approach links the binary outcome variable indicating the chosen university
to the university and applicant-university specific attributes and estimates the coefficients
that maximize the probability for the chosen category out of the student’s choice set. In
order to correct for correlations between the error terms within an individual’s choice set,
I cluster the standard errors by individuals.
Due to the university fixed effects Uj, the identification of the variables of interest –
excellence status and ranking indicators – solely relies on variation over time, i.e. the
introduction of the excellence competition and changes in the ranking between 2003
and 2006. Hence, unlike Bu¨ttner et al. (2003) and Helbig and Ulbricht (2010), who
estimate the effect of rankings without a university fixed effect, I can disentangle the
common knowledge regarding prestige and attractiveness of a medical department from
changes in the different quality indicators. Table 2 depicts the variation over time due to
changes in the ranking indicators from 2003 to 2006 and the introduction of the excellence
competition respectively. I observe between 2 and 10 universities out of the 34 universities
(5.88% - 29.41%) for which the according ranking indicator changes between 2003 and
2006. Thus, there is reasonable variation over time that I can exploit for my identification
strategy.
Table 2: Number of Universities with a Change in Excellence Status or
in a CHE Ranking Indicator over Time
Top Group / Excellence Bottom Group
# Universities % # Universities %
Excellence Status 6 17.65 n.a. n.a.
Professors’ Rec. 2 5.88 5 14.71
Research Reputation 5 14.71 8 23.53
Student-Prof. Ratio 7 20.59 10 29.41
# Clinic Beds 7 20.59 7 20.59
Students’ Satisfaction 5 14.71 9 26.47
Data Source: CHE ranking data (2003 and 2006), own calculations.
Moreover, the quality indicators studied are most likely exogenous to the applicants’
university choice. Nevertheless, endogeneity concerns could emerge with respect to the
indicator “students’ satisfaction”. This indicator represents how satisfied current students
are with their studies overall at a specific university. Peers of prospective students who
study medicine already may influence the ranking indicator and, at the same time, directly
the university choice of prospective students. However, endogeneity is a minor concern for
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the indicators evaluated by the professors (“professors’ recommendation” and “research
reputation”) and even more so for the hard facts “student-professor ratio” and the number
of “clinic beds”.
A common concern when applying a conditional logit model is the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. The assumption requires the relative risk of two
alternatives to be unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of other alternatives. In my
case, an exclusion or change in quality of university A should not affect the relative risk of
applying at university B versus applying at university C. I use a standard Hausman-type
test (Hausman and McFadden; 1984) to check this assumption. The results suggest that
my application of conditional logit estimation is not rejected by the Hausman test.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the conditional logit estimations that indicate if and
how prospective high-ability students are influenced by different quality indicators when
choosing a university. The estimated effects are displayed as odds ratios.10 Odds ratios
can be interpreted as a percentage change in the outcome variable induced by a unit
change in the variable of interest holding all other variables constant. More formally, the
odds ratio for variable xij is a proportional change in the odds of applicant i applying for
university j for a unit increase of xij all else being equal. An effect above (below) one
indicates an increase (decrease) in the odds to apply.
Table 3 depicts the odds ratios for the different quality indicators of the ranking and the
excellence initiative based on different specifications. According to the final specification
V, receiving excellence status increases the probability to apply by 19.3%. This translates
to an increase in application share for the treated “excellence universities” by about 2.44
percentage points.11 In specification VI, I add two variables to account for the shortlist
announcement in 2006 and 2007: a binary variable being one if a university was on the
shortlist in 2006 or 2007 and another binary variable indicating a failed excellence appli-
cation. The indicator for being shortlisted depicts a positive significant effect suggesting
an increase in the application probability by 28.9%, while the application probability for
a failed university does not change significantly. Thus, I observe an announcement effect,
which is a typical example of an Ashenfelter’s Dip (Ashenfelter; 1978). The effect of being
one of the universities on the shortlist even exceeds the estimated effect for the winners
10Odds ratios are calculated as eβˆ .
11The effect in percentage points is calculated by multiplying the average share of applications at
“excellence universities” (12.63%, see Table 1) with the percentage change indicated by the odds ratios
(12.63% × 0.193% = 2.44 percentage points). This calculation corresponds to the idea of an average
treatment effect on the treated.
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of the excellence initiative. This seems plausible as the media attention during this phase
of the initiative was at its highest.
Table 3: Effect of the Quality Indicators on the Application Probability (Odds Ratios)
I II III IV V VI
Excellence 1.122* 1.264*** 1.329*** 1.250** 1.193** 1.377***
(.068) (.097) (.110) (.111) (.102) (.150)
Exc. Shortlist 1.289***
(.127)
Exc. Failure .933
(.164)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 2.918*** 3.102*** 3.305*** .948 .982 .933
(.162) (.236) (.254) (.189) (.199) (.207)
Res. Rep. 2.537*** 3.007*** 2.826*** 1.313** 1.178 1.128
(.146) (.234) (.220) (.164) (.124) (.120)
Stud./Prof. 1.130** 1.064 1.071 1.113 1.113 1.066
(.067) (.070) (.072) (.122) (.121) (.118)
Clinic Beds 1.194*** 1.137** 1.108* .948 .920 .959
(.059) (.061) (.060) (.085) (.084) (.089)
Stud. Satisf. 1.172** 1.359*** 1.368*** 1.362** 1.355** 1.257*
(.085) (.109) (.110) (.169) (.170) (.173)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .344*** .275*** .301*** .761 .830 .870
(.042) (.033) (.036) (.167) (.185) (.196)
Res. Rep. .694*** .769*** .696*** .818 .832 .919
(.053) (.057) (.054) (.107) (.117) (.132)
Stud./Prof. .863*** .628*** .649*** .702*** .698*** .674***
(.037) (.031) (.034) (.067) (.066) (.065)
Clinic Beds 1.410*** 1.311*** 1.290*** .843 .804** .732***
(.069) (.073) (.071) (.095) (.089) (.084)
Stud. Satisf. .895** .861*** .869*** .828* .801** .790**
(.039) (.044) (.047) (.081) (.076) (.076)
Controls
Distance .976*** .976*** .976*** .983*** .983***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001)
Distance2 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Tuition Fees .767*** .783** .786** .809**
(.055) (.076) (.077) (.079)
Uni Places 1.000 1.002** 1.001** 1.001**
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Uni FE yes yes yes
Uni x Distance yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.1145 0.4051 0.4055 0.4319 0.4477 0.4479
# Individuals 4,535
N 154,190
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; additional missing dummies are included for the quality
indicators students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the number of clinic beds; clustered standard errors in
parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Regarding the different quality dimensions of the ranking, only the indicator “students’
satisfaction” increases the probability to apply at a university that is highly ranked
(+35.5%). The bottom rank variables for the “student-professor ratio”, the number of
“clinic beds” and the “students’ satisfaction” suggest that prospective students try to
avoid universities ranked poorly in these quality dimensions. The odds ratios manifest a
significant decrease in the probability to apply by 21 % to 33 %. The ranking dimensions
“professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation” do not significantly influence
the university choice of prospective students in the final specification. Hence, the non-
research indicators mentoring, infrastructure and students’ satisfaction seem to provide
more important information for the prospective students.
Bearing in mind that I look at the university choice of high-ability students, this might
seem counterintuitive. In fact, the mean statistics in Table 1 show a clear sorting along the
indicators “professors’ recommendation” and “research reputation” with higher shares of
applications in the top quality group. Hence, research quality is indeed very important
to the applicants. A possible explanation for the insignificant research indicator is that
the information on research quality is common knowledge even without the university
ranking. The publications of ranking indicators with respect to research quality then
contain only little new information. Furthermore, if high-ability students only apply for
the universities which are always ranked top in the research dimension, an improving
research quality of another university is unlikely to affect their university choice. This in-
terpretation is supported by the data as the significant influence of both research oriented
indicators disappears when I include university fixed effects and their interaction with dis-
tance to university, which capture the commonly known and time-constant attractiveness
of a university (see specifications III, IV and V).
In addition to the university fixed effects and its interactions with distance, I further
control for the distance between each university and a student’s hometown, the distance
squared, the introduction of tuition fees from 2006 onwards and the number of university
places supplied. Most importantly, the individually calculated distance to each university
and its square explains the university choice to a very large extent. While the Pseudo-R2
for specification I – containing only the university quality variables – amounts to 0.1145,
adding the distance variables rises the explanatory power to 0.4051 (specification II).
Hence, distance to a university overall is the most important determinant of university
choice even for the high-ability students in Germany. In the main model, each kilometer
a university is further apart lowers the probability to apply by 1.7 %. Considering that
the average distance between the nearest and the second nearest university amounts to
about 38 kilometers, German applicants are fairly immobile. As to be expected, tuition
fees decrease the application probability by about 21 % and per 10 additionally provided
university places the application probability rises by 1 %.
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All in all, the rankings seem to provide high-ability students mainly with information
concerning the non-academic quality. They use the additional information of the ranking
primarily to avoid universities with the worst quality in mentoring, faculty infrastructure
and the student assessment. However, receiving excellence status - which is also closely
related to research quality – increases the application probability significantly. Therefore,
the excellence competition may be regarded as an additional quality indicator providing
new information that exceed the commonly known university quality.
Regarding the IIA assumption, I use a Hausman test to check whether the assump-
tion holds and thus whether my application of a conditional logit model is appropriate.
Excluding one university at a time while estimating the university choice model (specifi-
cation V), the Hausman test mainly confirms the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The test fails for only 3 out of 33 sequentially excluded universities at a significance level
of 1 %.
To analyze the results of the excellence and ranking indicators in more detail, Table 4
presents the heterogeneous effects with respect to the applicant’s gender. The results
for women show the same significant results as in the full sample. Achieving excellence
status and a good evaluation by the current students rise the application probability,
while low quality in mentoring, faculty infrastructure and the student assessment yields
a decreasing application probability. For men, however, the picture is different. Their
university choice does not seem to be influenced by the excellence initiative. Furthermore,
I do not find a significant positive effect for any top quality ranking indicator. Similar
to the estimates for women, men have a lower application probability if the university
provides an unfavorable student-professor ratio or if current students evaluate it poorly.
A low rank with respect to research reputation also reduces the odds to apply for men,
while female students do not react to this indicator.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Quality Indicators by Gen-
der (Odds Ratios)
Women Men
Excellence 1.259** 1.553*** 1.113 1.167
(.131) (.210) (.163) (.218)
Exc. Shortlist 1.420*** 1.010
(.173) (.188)
Exc. Failure .989 .915
(.216) (.274)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.117 1.099 .751 .709
(.276) (.300) (.271) (.280)
Res. Rep. 1.128 1.061 1.315 1.291
(.149) (.143) (.232) (.230)
Stud./Prof. 1.035 .994 1.275 1.238
(.134) (.132) (.262) (.258)
Clinic Beds .917 .968 .911 .927
(.100) (.107) (.156) (.160)
Stud. Satisf. 1.558*** 1.378* 1.030 1.019
(.232) (.226) (.254) (.272)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .744 .808 1.159 1.170
(.206) (.227) (446) (.451)
Res. Rep. .950 1.087 .562** .584*
(.158) (.186) (.152) (.161)
Stud./Prof. .768** .737*** .583*** .574***
(.088) (.085) (.101) (.100)
Clinic Beds .674*** .590*** 1.142 1.101
(.091) (.083) (.221) (.220)
Stud. Satisf. .844* .831 .731* .726**
(.101) (.100) (.118) (.118)
Pseudo R2 0.4407 0.4411 0.4742 0.4742
# Individuals 3,023 1,512
N 102,782 51,408
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; covariates: distance,
distance2, tuition fees and uni places; additional missing dummies are included
for the quality indicators students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the num-
ber of clinic beds; clustered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate
significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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Note that the sample of men is by half smaller than the female sample. Some estimates,
thus, can also be insignificant due to the smaller sample size. Using a 50% random sample
of the females for estimation, similar to the men sample only the bottom rank indicators
“student-professor ratio”, the number of “clinic beds” and the “students’ satisfaction”
remain significant (see Table A.2).
As a robustness check, I estimate a pseudo introduction of the excellence competition in
2004 and 2005 and a pseudo change in the university ranking in 2005 (see Table 5). If the
applied university choice model is appropriate, the quality indicators should not affect
the applicants’ decision at a point in time before the indicators became public. Therefore,
I create a dummy variable indicating that the “excellence universities” received the ex-
cellence status already in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and I assign the ranking indicators
of the second ranking, published in 2006, already to the corresponding universities in the
year 2005.
Restricting the observation period to the years 2003 - 2005 and estimating the main
models (specifations V and VI in Table 3) yields mainly non-significant results for the
achieving excellence status as well as for being shortlisted or having failed to obtain
excellence status. In the full sample, only the bottom rank indicator for the number
of clinic beds is negatively related to the application probability. This effect is only
significant at the 10 % level. Compared to the main estimations in Table 3, the effect
lost significance.
Estimations on the female sample yield the same weakly significant correlation between
poor infrastructural quality and the application probability. The specification incorporat-
ing only the main excellence indicator also shows a significant increase in the probability
to apply for “excellence universities” although the status “excellence university” has not
been awarded at this point in time. However, the effect loses its significance in the spec-
ification incorporating dummy variables for the universities being shortlisted and having
failed within the excellence initiative. Estimations using the sample of men do not show
any significant results. As mentioned above, smaller sample sizes may be partly respon-
sible for the less significant results. These pseudo estimations are only a crude check of
robustness as they are based on only one post-reform year of observation. Nevertheless
and despite the few remaining significant effects, the robustness check in general sup-
ports my results and suggests that my estimates indeed reflect the influence of changes
in quality indicators on the university choice of high-ability students.
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Table 5: Pseudo Introduction of Excellence Competition and Change
in Rankings (Odds Ratios)
Full Sample Women Men
Excellence 1.266 1.129 1.481** 1.286 .999 .825
(.192) (.388) (.292) (.557) (.245) (.479)
Exc. Shortlist .886 .859 .818
(.290) (.356) (.451)
Exc. Failure .783 .674 .887
(.288) (.312) (.572)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.306 1.267 1.189 1.112 1.504 1.540
(.381) (.379) (.427) (.415) (.779) (.802)
Res. Rep. .875 .871 .845 .839 .943 .943
(.137) (.137) (.168) (.166) (.253) (.253)
Stud./Prof. 1.199 1.177 1.137 1.093 1.188 1.199
(.213) (.210) (.246) (.239) (.395) (.400)
Clinic Beds .874 .891 .940 .977 .746 .749
(.128) (.134) (.169) (.181) (.195) (.198)
Stud. Satisf. .997 1.000 .964 .975 1.133 1.112
(.204) (.206) (.242) (.246) (.434) (.428)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.063 1.109 1.388 1.509 .529 .530
(.370) (.393) (.588) (.661) (.361) (.364)
Res. Rep. .704 .713 .765 .789 .678 .680
(.157) (.160) (.210) (.218) (.269) (.270)
Stud./Prof. 1.040 1.043 .963 .968 1.211 1.214
(.137) (.138) (.155) (.156) (.299) (.300)
Clinic Beds .734* .727* .687* .673* .691 .690
(.121) (.120) (.150) (.147) (.191) (.192)
Stud. Satisf. .903 .913 .826 .843 .981 .983
(.135) (.136) (.158) (.161) (.246) (.247)
Pseudo R2 0.4812 0.4812 0.4828 0.4829 0.5007 0.5007
# Individuals 1,969 1,266 703
N 66,946 43,044 23,902
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own calculations; covariates: distance, distance2,
tuition fees and uni places; additional missing dummies are included for the quality indicators
students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the number of clinic beds; clustered standard errors
in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I distinguish the importance of different university ranking dimensions for
the university choice of high-ability students. Quality indicators considered are the “pro-
fessors’ recommendation’, “research reputation”, “student-professor ratio”, the number
of “clinic beds” and “students’ satisfaction”. Furthermore, I provide an evaluation of
an excellence competition run by the German government awarding universities with an
outstanding future concept for top-level research. Using administrative application data
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for all German medical schools, I estimate a random utility model of the high-ability
students’ application choice in a conditional logit setting. Identification relies on the
variation over time induced by changes in the ranking indicators between the first pub-
lication in 2003 and the second in 2006 as well as by the introduction of the excellence
initiative in 2006 and 2007. This allows me to distinguish the effect of changes in the
different quality indicators from the general attractiveness of a university.
The evaluation of the excellence initiative shows that in course of the competition the
share of applicants increased at the winning universities, which are today known as “ex-
cellence universities”. On average, achieving excellence status increases the application
probability by 19%, which relates for the “excellence universities” to an increase in ap-
plications of about 2.44 percentage points. Hence, the excellence competition and the
accompanying media attention provide additional information that exceeds the common
knowledge on university attractiveness and thus affect the university choice of high-ability
students.
The results regarding the different ranking indicators suggest that the non-research di-
mensions “student-professor ratio”, the number of “clinic beds” and the “students’ sat-
isfaction” rather than the research-oriented indicators widen the basis of information for
choosing a university. This does not by any means suggest that high-ability students
in Germany do not care about research quality. In fact, research quality affects their
university choice significantly. However, the research quality of German medical schools
is rather recognized as part of the common knowledge regarding university attractiveness
and, as such, is captured by the incorporated university fixed effects. Hence, the research
dimension of the ranking does not provide the high-ability applicants with any new infor-
mation, while the indicators regarding mentoring, faculty infrastructure and the student
assessment do. The ranking indicators are thus, especially in the non-research dimen-
sions, in action where they add new information to the common knowledge of universities’
research reputation.
Providing information on all quality dimensions separately instead of publishing univer-
sity rankings in aggregated league tables can thus be useful to support a well-informed
university choice. This in turn could reduce drop-out rates, increase human capital pro-
duction and – depending on the social welfare function – also increase overall welfare.
An important prerequisite for the ranking to improve the applicant-university match,
though, is that the quality indicators reflect real quality differences. Therefore, the dis-
cussions about ranking methodology are important for assessing the benefits of university
rankings (e.g. see Cremonini et al.; 2008).
Another positive aspect of publishing multidimensional rankings is that the universities
well-known for their top level research also need to guarantee a good standard with re-
spect to the non-research ranking indicators if they want to attract high-ability students.
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Top research institutes, therefore, cannot completely specialize in research and fully ne-
glect e.g. mentoring quality as a low rank in the non-research indicators also lowers the
application probability of high-ability students. Hence, multidimensional rankings could
induce incentives for the top research institutes also to invest in the non-research quality
dimensions.
When interpreting my results, it is important to keep in mind that the distance between a
student’s hometown and the university remains the most powerful determinant of univer-
sity choice in Germany. Quality indicators, as shown affect university choice, especially
if they add new information to the common knowledge of universities’ research reputa-
tion, but due to the immobility of students only to a moderate extend. Either German
students are simply reluctant to move far away from their hometown, even if they benefit-
ted from attending a high-quality university, or they still recognize the German medical
schools as a group of homogeneous quality such that there is no need for them to apply
at universities further away from their hometown.
A factor limiting the generalization of my analysis is that I focus on the university deci-
sion of high-ability students. High-ability students are probably intrinsically motivated
to a high degree and, therefore, are personally very interested in attending one of the
best universities. Moreover, students with the best grade in their final secondary school
exam are not constrained by admission thresholds. Therefore, the influence of the differ-
ent ranking indicators on average students can differ from my results. The dimensions
not related to research could be even more important for average students as they, for
example, might expect to need more and better mentoring.
Another concern is that medical students could be different from students of other sub-
jects. In that case, it is unclear whether the effects of the different quality indicators can
be translated to the behavior of university applicants in general. This is even more so as
the German job market in the field of medicine is not as competitive as in other fields.
To signal ones quality on the labor market by the quality of the attended university,
therefore, could be even more important in other fields than medicine.
Overall, analyzing the importance of different quality indicators for choosing a university,
I show not only that university rankings do affect high-ability students in the application
process but also that the influence of the ranking indicators differ with respect to the
quality dimensions. Therefore, publishing multidimensional university rankings widens
the basis of information for prospective students. University applicants can decide which
quality dimensions are most important to them and, subsequently, may apply with a
higher probability at the university that fits them best.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Excellence Status and Ranking Indicators by University (Ranking 2003 vs. 2006)
University of ... Exc. Prof. Rec. Res. Rep. Stud./Prof. Clinic Beds Stud. Satisf.
2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006
Aachen 2007 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1
Berlin 2007 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2
Bochum no 2 3 2 3 3 3 x 1 3 3
Bonn no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3
Dresden no 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Du¨sseldorf no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 x 3
Erlangen-Nu¨rnb. no 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 x 2 2
Essen no 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1
Frankfurt/Main no 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2
Freiburg 2007 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
Gießen no 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Go¨ttingen 2007 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3
Greifswald no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Halle no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1
Hamburg no 2 2 2 2 1 3 x x 3 3
Hannover no 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2
Heidelberg 2007 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2
Heidelb.-Mannh. no 2 1 2 1 3 x 2 2 2 x
Jena no 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 1
Kiel no 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2
Cologne no 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3
Leipzig no 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2
Lu¨beck no 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1
Magdeburg no 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mainz no 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3
Marburg no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 x 3 2
Munich 2006 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2
Mu¨nster no 2 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 1 1
Regensburg no 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
Rostock no 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 2
Saarbru¨cken no 2 3 2 3 3 2 x 1 2 3
Tu¨bingen no 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Ulm no 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
Wu¨rzburg no 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
1(2,3): top (middle, bottom) ranking group; x: indicator missing; Exc.: Excellence status; Prof. Rec.: Professors’
Recommendation; Res. Rep.: Research Reputation evaluated by Professors; Stud./Prof.: Student-Professor ratio; Clinic
Beds: Number of clinic beds; Stud. Satisf.: Students’ Satisfaction.
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Table A.2: Heterogeneous Effects us-
ing a 50 % Random Sample of Fe-
males (Odds Ratios)
Women
Excellence 1.261 1.449*
(.188) (.280)
Exc. Shortlist 1.278
(.218)
Exc. Failure .911
(.295)
Top Rank
Prof. Rec. 1.113 1.046
(.388) (.404)
Res. Rep. .953 .914
(.171) (.166)
Stud./Prof. 1.047 1.009
(.193) (.195)
Clinic Beds .831 .868
(.129) (.136)
Stud. Satisf. 1.297 1.197
(.273) (.282)
Bottom Rank
Prof. Rec. .659 .704
(.261) (.281)
Res. Rep. 1.102 1.222
(.258) (.298)
Stud./Prof. .745* .722**
(.120) (.118)
Clinic Beds .669** .609***
(.125) (.117)
Stud. Satisf. .650** .639***
(.110) (.110)
Pseudo R2 0.4460 0.4463
# Individuals 3,023
N 102,782
Data Source: ZVS Data (2003-2008), own cal-
culations; covariates: distance, distance2, tu-
ition fees and uni places; additional missing
dummies are included for the quality signals
students’ tip, student-professor ratio and the
number of clinic beds; clustered standard errors
in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance
at the 10/5/1 percent level.
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